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PREFACE
There are a number of theories concerning
the creation
and the maintenance of international coal
itions.

Some of

them are extremely vague, few are fully
worked out, and some
of them contradict one another.

It is hoped that this work

will aid in the clarification of "why"
many international organizations fail to achieve a strong degree
of cohesion.

As

is pointed out in the paper, several
of the elements necessary
for the maintenance of cohesion in inte
rnational groupings
come into direct conflict with the major
goals and aspirations
of international alliances.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organ-

ization, and its futile effort to establis
h a multilateral nuclear force, is a prime example of this cont
inuing "quest for
cohesion." Intra-alliance politics are permeate
d with this
struggle for harmony and cooperation.
My special thanks are due to all individu
als with whom
I communicated concerning this pape
r.

Special thanks are in

order to Dr. Faye Carroll, director of
my graduate committee,
and to Dr. Georg

Bluhm and Dr. Thomas Madron whose collabor-

ation and criticisms have been of inestima
ble value on many
points of concern.
W.E.B.
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CHAPTER I
THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (a military alliance) is a major component in the contemporary international
scene.

Relations among the various entities in this scene are

characterized by three features that give the international
milieu its distinctive and unique nature.
First, the international milieu consists of several divergent parts.

In other words, it is fragmented:

whole made up of a variety of actors.

a changing

In such a system, each

individual part places its highest allegiance upon itsrlf, or
at least considers that the achievement cf any higher aim is
inseparable from the preservation of its main interest and
values.

As a result, international politics remain in a sus-

pended state of competition.1
The second facet that must be remembered by the student
of international relations is that such groupings differ in
many ways:

in resources, in governmental structure, in in-

ternal solidarity and external awareness, in economic stability, philosophical outlook, in historical background, and in
geographical location.

Such differences contribute to a fun-

damental uncertainty within this state of competition.
1Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles: Or the Setting
of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1968), p. 10 . Published for the Council on Foreign Relations.
1
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The third characteristic is the
absence of any temporal
power capable of effectively cont
rolling these competing units.
This condition encourages the sett
lement of differences through
forceful and/or violent moans.

Stanley Hoffmann stated this

premise when he wrote:
The absence of any temporal power
above these competing
units leaves them free to resort to
force in order to
attain objectives which the very inte
nsity of the contest
(and the determination of most contesta
nts to frustrate
ambitions incompatible with thei
r own) makes inaccessible
by peaceful means alone. To sum
up: world politics . . .
is marked by a prevalence of conf
lict over cooperation
(bearing in mind that many forms
of international cooperation are themselves responses
to conflict, and that even
these suffer the continuation of
conflict within them).2
"An international system is the ense
mble constituted by
political units that maintain regu
lar relations with each other and that are all capable of
being implicated in a generalized war."3 NATO fits the
criteria of this basic definition.
This paper proposes to undertak
e a comprehensive investigation into the role, attitude
s, and interrelationships of West
Germany, France, Great Britain,
and the United States within
the framework of the North Atla
ntic Treaty Organization. This
investigation will be limited to
the involvement of these four
member states in the proposed esta
blishment, and eventual failure of a NATO controlled mult
ilateral nuclear force (RLF).
This limitation was imposed
because it was discerned that these
four major NATO members set
the tempo and boundaries for the
2

•

d.

3Richard Howard and Annette B.
Fox, Peace and War: A
Theory of International Rela
tions (New York: Doubleday Press,
1956), p. 94.

3
debate stemming from this. proposal.

The smaller member states

seemed reluctant to take a definite stance on the issue until
one of these four set forth its own convictions.

Once this

was done the smaller countries allied themselves with a major
member's view.

Thus, a study of the relationships and positions

of France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States will
lend itself to a full and precise investigation of the matter.
The time span involved in the major portion of this research
will be limited to the years 1960 through 1965, as these were
the years in which the MLF proposal had its origin, was debated,
and died from a lack of action.
The proposal for the MLF issued from many years of discussion within the framework of NATO concerning two principal
factors:

(1) the security of the United States' European al-

lies in the face of changing military technology, and (2) the
political requirements of maintaining alliance cohesion against
4
centrifugal forces that beset all military coalitions.

The

central technological fact that had to be considered was the
development of modern long-range missile weaponry systems, and
counter systems, of the East and the West (the Soviet Union and
the United States) until a semblance of parity was achieved.
The political facet that was paramount among the United States'
European allies was the credibility of American claims of protection once such nuclear parity became a reality.

Would the

United States under all circumstances risk its own cities and
4Thomas C. Wiegele, "The Origins of the MLF Concept, 19571960," Orbis, XII, (Summer, 19(8), 465-466.

4
populations in order to defend Europe against all aggressive
acts by her Eastern neighbors?

There also existed a degree of

apprehension among NATO members concerning the question of nuclear control within the Atlantic Alliance, for example the
double veto, single or mono-veto or uniimity.5

It is in this

environment of uncertainty of relationships that the multilateral concept will be investigated.
Aside from poor coordination or planning, one reason that
international alliances may fail to function effectively is
because they lack political cohesiveness.

That is to say

that such alliances may be ineffective because the,/ are riven
by internal quarrels, technological and political disagreements, and misunderstandings.
Any military coalition will be more effective and its
claims more credible to the extent that its members agree on
the major objectives; that they clearly and precisely define
such objectives; that they aid one another diplomatically;
and that they developla trust that once the casus foederis arises, the partners will in fact meet their stated obligations.6
Two hypothetical situations, general in structure, and
several precise arguments are utilized in the research of
'These terms refer to the manner of control to be used in
the event that the firing of nuclear weapons became a reality
.
The double veto implies a situation where the United
States
and the host country both must give permission for the firing.
The single veto system (unanimity) simply means that
any one
member of an alliance has the power to stop the use of nuclear
weapons assigned to the alliance.
6K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A framework for
Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1967), pp. 110-120.
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materials within the framework
of this theory.

The first hypothetical situation to 1)c
investigated is concerned with tho
fact that the effectivenes
s of an international military coa
lition is weakened or nullif
ied by a lack of cohesiveness
,
riven by internal quarrels,
among its member states. The
re
was no consensus (a _..ignif
icant amount of agreement measur
ed
through actions, votes,
etc.) among France, Germany, Gre
at
Britain, and the United Sta
tes concerning the degree of emp
hasis to be placed upon the
multilateral concept as a policy
of
nuclear deterrence. (An
intervening variable here that
is
capable of being measured
is the various views held by the
se
four members in reference
to the aggressive tendencies of
their
maj,)r military foe, the
Soviet Union.) The objective
s to be
achieved by the MLF were not
clearly and precisely defined
(each member visualized
this nuclear force in reference
to his
own country's conviction).
There was never an exact definitio
n
of the structural organizat
ion to be utilized for the pro
posed
multilateral nuclear force.
That is to say that the variou
s
administrative levels, such
as the proper chain of command,
the
veto powers of each partic
ipant, and various other admani
strative decisions were never
precisely nor even clearly def
ined
to the potential partic
ipants.
The second hypothetical sit
uation concerns itself with
the problem of national sov
ereignty within the alliance.
As
sovereign states (to retain
a major controlling decision in
international dealings concer
ning major policy criteria) the
members of the North Atlant
ic Treaty Organization were not
ready

6
nor willing to delega
te major decisions of pol
icy, especially
decisions pertaining to
peace and war, to each other,
nor to
any single central sys
tem such as the multilateral
nuclear
force (MLF). There was
no effective nuclear deterr
ent value
in the proposal for a
MLF because the credibility
of such a
force was weakeiled by
the various levels and typ
es of veto to
be exercised by each
participating member state.
(This proposal differed extens
ively from the previous Ame
rican "massive
retaliation" policy, "a
nuclear umbrella"). There
was a lack
of trust that once the
casus foederis arose, the
partners
would in fact meet the
ir commitments. (There has
been a longstanding lack of comple
te trust among these four maj
or members
of NATC due to a var
iety of economic, social, pol
itical and
historical differenc
es.)

^.4

CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL SKETCH

As was previously indicated, the proposal for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force issued from several
years of discussion within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization concerning two basic points:

(1) the security of the

United States' European allies in the face of changing military
technology and, (2) the political requirements of maintaining
alliance cohesion against centrifugal forces that beset all
7
military coalitions.
The launching of the Soviet Union's artificial sa2llite,
Sputnik I in October, 1957, emphasized to the United States
and to its European allies the fact that the Soviet Union had
now gained the capability to initiate and perhaps execute successfully an intercontinental launching of an atomic warhead.
In December of that year, the NATO heads of government authorized the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers (SHAPE) to conduct
a study of long-range missile capabilities within the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Out of these studies grew sug-

gestions for a force of mobile medium-range missiles in Western
Europe to be operated by a mixed-manned allied team.

7Wiegele, "The Origins of the MLF Concept, 1957-1960,"
465-66.
Pp.

8
Many such proposals pertaining to the prob
lem of nuclear
sharing were considered on both sides of
the Atlantic during
the years 1958 through 1960, with little
visible results.

In

November, 1960, General Lauris Norstad
proposed to make NATO
a "fourth nuclear power" with a multilat
eral atomic force
which would give the alliance control
over nuclear components
now held exclusively in United States
custody.

He spoke of

"extremely mobile units, some of which
operate by sea and some
of which operate by land."8
The Eisenhower Administration initially
embraced the Norstad proposal in an effort to countera
ct the Soviet threat
that had developed when the U.S.S.R.
began to deploy large
numbers of medium-range ballistic miss
iles (MRBM) in western
Russia and the Eastern satellite countrie
s.

However, upon

further consideration, this plan was
rejected.

It was argued

that large numbers of missiles moving
constantly throughout
Europe would disquiet the population
and encourage neutralist
9
tendencies.
Accordingly, a State Department study grou
p headed by
professor Robert R. Bowie, Director of the
Harvard Center for
International Affairs, suggested that NATO
's MRBM requirement
be met by Polaris missiles installed
on surface vessels and/or
submarines.

They were to be owned, maintained, and oper
ated

by all members who wished to particip
ate in the program.

Each

8NATO News
Letter, January, 1961, pp. 15-17.
9Henr
y A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership
(New York:
McGraw-Hill, 196!3), pp. 123-129.

9
ship was to be manned by crews of mixed nationalit
y, and each
participant was to have a veto over the use of these
forces.i°
This study made by Bowie had been requested by Secretary
of State Christian Herter.

The majn guidelines of this pro-

posal became the "Herter Suggestion" for a NATO coope
rative
nuclear force, which ultimately led to the MLF conce
pt.
Cyrus Sulzberger describes it:

As

"Herter adopted Norstad's ideas

about making NATO a fourth atomic power and
shook them up in a
cocktail with the thoughts of Robert Bowie."11
The Herter Proposal was presented at the NATO minis
terial
meeting in December of 1960.

It was at this time that the Sec-

retary of State proposed a "new concept for
the operation of
medium-range ballistic missiles."12

This so-called "new con-

cept" committed five American submarines, to
be armed wJ_th
eighty Polaris missiles, to the NATO Allia
nce.

In return,

other members would be expected to jointly
purchase from the
United States one hundred additional Polaris
missiles.

He ex-

plained that if our allies provided the addit
ional Polaris missiles on a multilaterally manned, owned, and
controlled basis
the United States would combine its five
submarines with this
contribution into a NATO deterrent force under
NATO command.
The question of control was left for
subsequent consideration.13
i°Ibid.
11The New York Times, February 22, 1961, p.
24.
12-The
New York Times, December 17, 1960, p. 1.
13
Christian A. Herter, Toward an Atlantic Community (New
York: Harper-Row, 1963), pp. 41-42.
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Lack of any immediate action on this proposal
was due to
the fact that the old Republican Administration was
in the process of leaving office and most Europeans
understandably creferred to await the views and actions of the
Kennedy Administration.

.ew, Dr .mocratic,

For a period of some months these new

policy makers studied NATO strategy and concluded
that greater
emphasis should be placed on conventional forces.

This change

of interest, opposing the previous concept of
massive retaliation, coincided with the new policy of flexible
response as advocated by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

Such a defense

posture, according to the new administration, was
designed to
develop the Western defense lino so that the allie
s could be
capable of containing any type of aggressive actio
n without
having to resort to total, all-out nuclear war in
every situation.

This was a safeguard against overreaction.

Such a

position would enhance the credibility of the
deterrence capacity of the NATO forces.
There were obvious actions in which a nuclear
deterrent
would be appropriate, but there remained a large
set of conflicts, for example in Berlin, or on the outlying
areas of NATO,
which would call for a limited response.

Consequently, conven-

tional rather than nuclear forces seemed to be the
pressing need
for the 1960's.

President John F. Kennedy reflected this
line

of thought in his speech to the Canadian Parli
ament on May 17,
1961.

He emphasized his conviction that NATO, to
meet its de-

fense requirements, must push forward simultaneo
usly along two
major lines.

Most important was the strengthening of the

11
conventional capability of the alli
ance.

Secondly, the avail-

ability of nuclear weapons for
defense purposes were to have
high priority.

He committed five Polaris atomic missile
sub-

marines to the NATO command area,
and spoke of "eventually establishing a NATO seaborne missile
force, which would be truly
multilateral in ownership and control,
once NATO's non-nuclear
goals have been achieved."14
The European allies were not particul
arly responsive to
the President's speech.
three counts:

Conventional build-up was resisted on

(1) that it might weaken the credibility
cf the

nuclear deterrent; (2) that it was
very expensive; (3) and
that it would do no good in view
of the presumed superiority
in numbers of the Warsaw Pact
troops.

Also, the missile gap

theory, stimulated by the launch of
the Soviet Sputnik, still
15
remained a grave concern in Western
Europe.
The precondition of a conventional
force build-up suggested that the MLF project was not
considered highly urgent
by the United States or by the majo
rity of the NATO members.
The European allies felt that
they could ill afford to simultaneously strengthen their conventional
forces and contribute
to a NATO nuclear force.

There followed a year of decreasing

interest in the MLF scheme.

In fact, at the regular NATO

14
U.S. Department of State Bulletin XLIV
, (June 5, 1961)
No. 1145, p. 841. "The Common Aims
of Canada and the United
States," Speech by President John F. Kenn
edy at Ottawa, May
17, 1961.
'William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Stra
tegy (New York:
Harper-Row, 1964), pp. 107-08.
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Ministerial Conference in Decemb
er of 1962, the United States
took no initiative with res
pect to this po1icy.1.6
An indication of the lack of com
mitment concerning the
MLF preea1 nay be illust
rated by the fact that one week fol
lowing
NATO 7inisteria1 meeting, the Uni
ted States in a
joint communique with Great Bri
tain, announced its intention
of committing Polaris missil
es to British owned and operated
submarines which were to be ass
igned within five years to a
multinational submarine force,
in the closest consultation
17
with ether NATO allies.
The meeting between Presid
ent Kennedy and Prime Minister
Harold Macmillan, held at Nas
sau in December, 1962, out of
which this joint communiqu
e emerged, was resultant of the
United States' decision to
cancel the Skybolt missile progra
m.
Great Britain had concluded
that its own strategic missile
program, the Bluestreak, was
a failure. With the cancellation of
this project, Britain desire
d to purchase the United States'
airto-surface ballistic missil
e, the Skybolt. The discontinuat
ion
of the research and planne
d production of this missile (Skybo
lt)
severely limited the Britis
h independent nuclear capability.
Whereas, the Skybolt was a lon
g-range air-to-ground missile,
which prolonged the techni
cal capacity of British independe
nt
operation and control of the
Strategic Command of the Royal
Air Force, the technical qua
lities of the Polaris system
16Kis
singer, The Troubled Partnersh
ip, p. 129.
17
U.S. Department of State Bullet
in XLVIII, (January 14,
1963) No.1229, p. 44. "Te
xt: Joint Communique and Attached
Statement on Nuclear Defens
e Systems," by President Kennedy
and Prime Minister Macmil
lan at Nassau, December 21, 1962.

13
excluded such independe
nt operation.

Under this system (Polari.

the British strategic
nuclear submarines were dep
endent upon
the availability of Ame
rican systems of navigational
aids, especially satellite.
Because of such dependenc
y, th2 British
acceptance of the Nassau
terms was regarded by many
European
states (especially France
) as a surrender of Great Bri
tain's
capacity for independent
nuclear action.
As a result of such agreem
ent concluded between Britai
n
and the United States
at Nassau, Great Britain mis
sed a unique
opportunity to convert
their nuclear arsenal int
o a real asset.
Rather than to continue
to pursue the mirage of an
independent
nuclear force (although it
was now directly dependent
on the
use of United States
satellites), Britain could hav
e proposed
to join the other mem
bers of the European Commun
ity in the development of an integrate
d joint nuclear force. Suc
h a proposal would have demonstra
ted to the European states
that "Britain
had cast her lot with the
Community and that de Gaulle
's 'European' claims were hollow
if he would not take part.u 18
President Charles de Gau
lle's response to the Nassau
Agreement came in the form of
a press conference on Januar
y 14, 1963.
When asked about the Fre
nch pcsition concerning the
proposed
multilateral nuclear force,
as advocated by the Nassau
Agreement, de Gaulle stated tha
t "to turn over our weapon
s to a multilateral force, under
foreign command, would be
to act contrary
18
Robert R. Bowie, "Tensions
Within the Alliance,"
Foreign Affairs, XLII, (Oc
tober, 1963), pp. 49-69.
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to the principles of our defense and our
policy."

He also

indicated that it would be useless for France to
purchase the
Polaris missiles offered by the United States in
accordance
with the Yassau Agreement, as France had neithe
r the submarines
to launch nor the thermonuclear warheads to arm
them.
French fear of American domination was also expres
sed by
that country's opposition to the entry of Great
Britain into
the Common ?larket (EEC) because of the "speci
al" relationship
that Britain had with the United States.

In effect, de Gaulle

proclaimed that the English were linked too closel
y, economically, militarily (Nassau) and traditionally, with
a crowd of
other states, and especially with the United States
.

He de-

clared that the "cohesion" of the Atlantic Community
would soon
disappear under "American dependence and leadership
wh'eh would
soon swallow up the European Community."20
Finally, in this January 14, press conference, the
French
President contributed to a further splintering
of opinion within

NATO as he hinted of a Franco-German treaty of cooper
ation.

When asked if Germany could be equipped with and have
control
of nuclear weapons, he replied:

"It is evident that there is

a close solidarity between the defense of Germany and that
of
France, but it is up to Federal Germany to say what
it wishes
and to conduct its own policy.“21
19
Charles de Gaulle, Maior Addresses, Statements and Press
Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle: May 19, 1958-Janu
ary
31 1964, p. 214.
201 bid.
21Ibid.
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The French veto in 1963, of Brit
ish membership in the Common Market, was fundamentall
y connected with an already existing
basic European-American dispute that
developed in the relations
of the Old World with the New Worl
d during the post World War
II years. This lessening of cohe
sion is amply exemplified in
the proposal for and debate concerni
ng a NATO multilateral nuclear force. Essentially, emerging
Europe was desirous of a
more self-respecting role in the
European-American relationship.
This desire had developed quite
strongly by 1963 and was steadily becoming stronger. European
s felt that it was time to redress the balance within the NATO
Alliance. Europe was clearly
aware of how radically the situatio
n of Europe relative to the
United States had changed sinc
e the immediate post-war years
of disunity and disparity. In
other words, Europe felt that
its present role did not appear
to correctly reflect such
changes or to be in line with Euro
pe's relative growth in
22
strength and unity.
With such enhanced confidence, the Euro
pean members of NATO desired a larg
er more responsible role in
the planning and execution of Alli
ance strategy, and control
over the forces for its defense, espe
cially nuclear.
French insistence on an independ
ent national nuclear force,
coupled with her overtures of coop
eration with the Federal
Republic, made the MLF the cent
ral fccus for the United States
during 1963. It was believed by
the Kennedy Administration that
the establishment of a multilateral
nuclear force would limit
nuclear aspirations, especially with
respect to Germany.
22Bowie,

"Tensions Within the Alliance." p.
53.

16
In line with this belief, President Kennedy quickly dispatched Livingston Merchant in March, 1963 (his Special Ambassador) to Europe in order to explain in depth the United States'

pyopc- a4

:11t...iatera1 nuclear force.

Such a force would

consist of twenty-five surface ships loaded with nuclear-armed
Polaris missiles with a maximum range of 2,500 miles.

These

ships would have crews of mixed nationalities, and would be
controlled by a multinational board drawn from those NATO member
states that provided ships, crews, port facilities, or other
contributions to the upkeep of the force.23

The United States,

realizing that both defense plans (nuclear and conventional)
would possibly prove too costly for most countries, dropped
the previous prior condition of conventional force
build-up.
The proposal for a NATO controlled multilateral force continued as a major premise of American foreign policy through the
following two years (1963-64), as the Johnson Administration
took office.

The initial reaction in Europe to this proposal

was civil but far from enthusiastic.

As American pressure (both

official and unofficial) increased, country after country declined support for the proposal (lessening of cohesion).

Canada,

Norway, Denmark, Portugal, and especially France express
ed no
interest at all in any form of participation, while the smaller
and poorer members were concerned with the potential cost
of
even a small share of such a force.

Many of the naval staffs

235, I. Coffey,
"A NATO Nuclear Deterrent?," Orbis VII
:Fall, 1964), p. 584.
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of the countries involved were doubtful, if not highly
skeptical, concerning the operational viability of such a
force.
Public opinion seemed generally disinterested and in
cases open 3

hostile.

SCAM-,

No one could see how the 1.,7 . ohlein ol el--

trol was going to be solved.

The United Kingdom had atfirst

hesitantly supported the proposal but became increasingly
opposed as Washington continued to pressure her for a defini
te
24
commitment.
The relationships (cohesion) within the North
Atlantic alliance were sorely strained over this issue.
The signing of the treaty pertaining to the establ
ishment
of a multilateral force was to be completed by the end
of 1964,
with ratification in early 1965.

Britain, far from being to-

tally supportive, was expected not to refuse the
project since
it had advanced so far (a new. Labor Party had just
taken office,.

Smaller countries would follow the British lead.

France had a choice, so the reasoning went, to cooperate
or
-'5
to be isolated.
'
By December, 1964, no treaty had been completed.

However,

it still seemed possible that some kind of force, to
include
at least Germany, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and the
United States might yet emerge.
French opposition came into the open as American pressure
increased, and Germany was caught in the struggle between its
closest allies.

The Secretary General of NATO announced that

in his opinion, a unanimous consent would be required in
the

24A1.astair Buchan, "The Multilateral Force: An Historical
Perspective," Adephi Papers, No. 13 (October, 1964), p. 12.
2
5Kssn
iiger, The Troubled Partnership.

p. 1 -
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setting up of a multilateral force, thus giving the opposing
countries an effective veto.

The MLF initiated in the hope of

furthering allied cohesion, had become an element of discord.
Ahiatus of approximately o-- e year olrapE,-d, as 1-1,-:::cpc
America awaited the outcome of the German elections which took
place in September, 1965.

During this interim period, a new

factor arose which sealed the fate of the MLF.

The United

Nations Disarmament Committee, dormant for several years, was
activated when the Soviet Union evidenced an interest in a
treaty prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons to
non-nuclear powers.

Russia specifically referred to the multi-

lateral nuclear force proposal.
Although the Western countries rejected the Russian suggestion, it was successful in splintering opinion in an already
divisive scene.

Many saw the anti-dissemination treaty as an

important step toward world peace.

Even West Germany, the most

ardent European supporter of the MLF proposal, now expressed
reservations.

On December 21, 1965, during a state visit to

Washington, Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and President Lyndon B.
Johnson buried the MLF in silence, promising that the issue of
nuclear control would be discussed again at some date in the
27
near future.
The multilateral nuclear force debate, which
had spanned a five year period, had ceased to be a viable part
of American NATO policy at this point.

261bia.
27Harold van B. Cleveland, The Atlantic Idea and Its European Rivals (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 60-63.

CHAPTER III
(XNCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES
The implementation of a
multilateral nuclear for
ce within
the North Atlantic Tre
aty Organization had as
one of its main
objectives the strengthe
ning of cohesion within
the Alliance.
With the ultimate fai
lure of this project, a
lack of cohesion
within NATO became viv
idly apparent.
Any international organi
zation,whether it be civ
il or military, becomes more eff
ective with the developme
nt of a higher
degree of cohesion amo
ng its major members con
cerning basic
policies. NAtO is agg
regative or collective in
nature. Thus,
a necessary element of
such a group is cohesiven
ess or togetherness. "Either
it fc-ohesiog reaches a
meaningful level
or an alliance is sim
ply academic." 28
An alliance derives
its solidarity from common
goals or
purposes. The amount
of cohesion is relative to
the group's
vitality as opposed to
its durability. The gre
atest basis for
unity within an allian
ce is a common agreement
on matters directly bearing on the
reason(s) for establishing
the group,
such as those concerned
with the defense of the
member territories from conventional
or nuclear aggression.29
However,
military strategy is
not an isolated function of
alliances or
28Julian Friedman, Christ
opher Bladen, and Steven
Alliance in Internationa
Rosen,
l Politics (Boston: All
yn and Bacon
Inc., 1970), pp. 288-89
.
29Ibid.
1_9
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their members, but is an integrat
ing component of the overall
policy (both foreign and domestic
) of allied partner states.
Politics and military strategy are ulti
mately inseparable.30
An additional factor which bears directly
on cohesion, or
the lack of cohesion, within an alli
ance is that all objectives
of that group be clearly and prec
isely defined.

In a time of

war, alliance cohesion is clearly
shown through the mutual
actions against a common enemy.

In time of peace there are

few conclusive signs of unification.

In such a situation each

alliance member is caught in a web of
lingering doubts concerning his relationship with othe
rs.
One of the direct causes of division
s within the Atlantic
Alliance was General Charles de Gaul
le and his actions.

But

no one single individual nor coun
try was responsible for all
the tensions and divisions of NATO
.

President de Gaulle in-

tensified and capitalized on seve
ral serious strains arising
from other (existing) sources within
the North Atlantic Community and within Europe.

For an adequate diagnosis, it is

necessary to put these deeper causes,
such as economic, social,
political, and military differences,
into their proper perspective.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organiza
tion is a defensive

military alliance operating unde peac
r
e time conditions.

As

such, it has failed to retain many
of the cchesive qualities
that originally made such a grouping
imperative.

NATO was con-

ceived as a defense aoainst what was
considered to be an immediate attack by massive communis
t forces across the borders of
30
Kurt Birrenbach, "European Integration
and Atlantic Partnership," in NATO In Quest of Cohesion
, ed. by Carl H. Cerny and
Henry Briefs (New York: Frederic
k A. Praeger, 1965), p. 285.
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Its origins were
derived in the inab
ility of
the Allied powe
rs of World War II
to make an adequa
te settlement. With the
defeat of the Axis
powers, and the pr
esence of
large numbers of
Soviet forces in ce
ntral Europe, the
time appeared ripe for
ccmmunist power an
d influence to sp
read deep
into Western Eu
rope. It was in th
is atmosphere of
uncertainty
that the developm
ent of a defensiv
e alliance (NATO)
was construed. Mutual
fears and aspirati
ons helped to ceme
nt the bonds
of the NATO ag
reement.
Western Europe.

NATO, created in
a time of crisis,
developed its cont
emporary shape and
form from a sustai
ned period of tens
ion. The
fact that there
seems to be an ap
parent relaxation
in East-West
relations has su
bjected the allian
ce to a multitude
of new
strains. The ab
sence of unmistakab
le pressure, spec
ifically of
a military nature
, has contributed
to the loosening
of ties
within the Wester
31
n Alliance.
The original obje
ctives of NATO
seem less pressi
ng, and thus are le
ss a reason for st
rong cohesive relations am
ong the members.
Such an alliance
, moreover,
is likely to be
far more unified on
reasons for resi
sting a
common enemy than
on teims for accomm
odating allied st
ates.
The tacts that
the Soviet combat
forces in Easter
n Europe
had seemingly be
en substantially re
duced, that they
had been
supplied with ta
ctical nuclear weap
ons, and that th
e Soviet
Union had set in
place approximately
seven hundred an
d fifty
nuclear missiles
targeted on Western
Europe and capabl
e of
31Hans 3. Morgen
thau, "The Crisis of
NATO In Quest of
the Alliance," in
Cohesion, ed. by Karl
H. Cerny and Henr
Briefs (Ncw York
y W.
: Frederick A. Prae
ger, 1965), p.
285.
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covering every major target the
re, gave credence to the prevailing view held by many wester
n leaders in late 1963, that
the main n=pose of Ru.ssiar. mil
itary p:]icy
Ful-opc2 was :.ot
aggression or military pressure
but rather nuclear deterrence. 3i
However, if one were to realistic
ally (objectively) view the
Warsaw Pact area and its milita
ry organization, that is, as concerns the character of total mil
itary dependence on Moscow and
the entire military entity of
Eastern Europe, it would be
clearly noted that to some deg
ree nothing has been changed
through detente. Evidently, the
Soviet military forces insure,
through the use and/or threat
of military power, that the military organization of the Easter
n bloc countries remain completely untouched by the up
and downs of the Kremlin's tactic
s
of tension and detente.33
This point was vividly demonstra
ted
by the Soviet invasion of Czecho
slovakia in summer 1968.
If militarily the Soviet Uni
on seemed as much on the defersive as the West, the ide
ological convictions and political
ambitions of its leaders appear
ed to be no longer eminently relevant to the security of NATO.
It appeared to many of the
statesmen of the western world
that the tense and seemingly innamable confrontation had gra
dually subsided into a stalemate.34
In this limited sense the "cold
war" in Europe was now a thing
32Alistair Buchan, "The Balanc
e of Power," in Defense: A
Financial Times Survey (Londo
n: Time Ltd., March 23, 1964),
p. 17.
33Alfons Dalma, "The Risks of
a Detente Policy to Central
Europe," in Changing East-West Rel
ations and the Unity of the
West, ed. by Arnold Wolfers (Pa
ltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press
1964), p. 121.
34Clevel
and, The Atlantic Idea and Its Europe
an Rivals,
pp. 8-9.
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of the past.

Some indices of this trend toward the easing
of

tensions (détente) may be drawn from the
facts that by 1965:
(1) although young Americans were stil
l subject to a two year
riLita-zy draft, 1., ost ;;estern European coun
tries had reduced
theirs to eighteen months or, as in the
case of the Federal
Republic of Germany, to one year.
inated conscription entirely.

The United Kinodom had elim-

(2) Britain refrained from in-

creasing her land forces on the Continen
t.

(3) And France re-

fused even to cooperate with the NATO conun
and in natters of
strategic planning.

Both the United Kingdom and France had ig-

nored the American wish for a limitati
on of nuclear proliferation and the development of independent
national nuclear
forces, thus failing to aid one another dipl
omatically, while
at the same time Western Europe had subs
tantially increased its
trade with the Soviet bloc. 35
Although there exists no conclusi\
attachment nor relationship between trad
e and detente, the increase in East-West trade must be mentione
d because of its impact on the relations between the states
of the NATO Alliance.
Most prominent disagreements within the West
ern Alliance
concerning trade (lessening cohesion) have
been, on the whole,
limited to questions of East-West trad
e, the embargo on strategic materials, and the granting of
credits.

The difference of

opinion arising over such questions have
been partly due to commercial considerations.

A country such as England, whose for-

eign commerce forms a large proportion
of her whole econemic activity, was more averse to limit trade
with the Communist bloc
35Ronald Steel, The End of Alliance:
America and the Future
of Eurcpe (New York: Dell Publishi
ng Co., Inc., 196.4), p. 140.
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countries on political grounds than Aserica, whose commercial
interests were relatively insignificant in comparison. 36
In 1950, Foviet export and import orade with non-communist
countries totaled five hundred and fifoy million dollars.

In

1963 Soviet import/export trade with the non-communist world
had risen to four billion dollars.

In this same year (1963)

nine to ten billion dollars worth of total communist trade consisted of exports to and imports from non-communist countries.
For example, West Germany exchanged about one billion dollars
worth of goods with the various communist countries.

The Brit-

ish imported Soviet timber in large quantities and exported
substantial amounts of machinery to that country.

Even the

United States, upon finding itself with a large surplus of
wheat, exported it to the Soviet Union.

37

Another major indicator of a relaxation of tensions in
East-West relations may be drawn from the figures for the total
percent of NATO members gross national products (GNP) expended
for military defense for the years 1945-1967.38

One may con-

clude from these figures that, since the tension-laden years
1951-P-)54, with the death of Joseph Stalin on March 3, 1953,
the subsequent power shift in the Soviet Government, and the
outbreak and conclusion of the Rorean conflict (June 1950July 1953), the percent expended for defense hat been
36Kenneth Younger, "Relaxation of East-West Tension and
Its Effect Upon the West," in Chanainc East-West Relations
and the Unity of the West, ed. by ArnoLd Wolfers (Baltimore:
The johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 9.
37
Harold Perman, "A Reappraisal cf the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade
Policy," Harvard Business Review, XLIII ..7.s1y-August, 1964),
p. 140.
38For 1 more diled listing of fas-s and figures of
GNP of NATO members, see Appendix A; pasa 56 of this report.
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significantly re
duced, although the
total cash value
has increased slightly du
e to a rising stan
dard of living in
the
countries concer
ned.
IM.is feeling of de
tente was strength
ened by the conv
iction of both th
e NATO allies and
the Warsaw Pact co
untries
that the two main
nuclear powers woul
d avoid a direct mi
litary
confrontation for
an indefinite peri
od. Such examples
of
Washington-Moscow
cooperation as th
e establishment of
a direct
line of communicat
ion (the hot-line
) in 1,
.ugust, 1963, talks
of
possible troop di
sengagement in Eu
rope, and moves to
ward nonproliferation of
nuclear weapons ad
ded credence to this
belief.
A nuclear test-ban
treaty was signed
by more than one hu
ndred
countries in 1963
. Disappointing
as this treaty was,
in the
sense that it fail
ed to pave the wa
y for a system of
mutual
arms inspection, it
was the first form
al expression of a
common
interest between
the United States
and the Soviet Union
concerning the control of
nuclear weapons.40
Rumored United St
ates-Soviet Union
bilateral discussi
ons
were met by agreem
ent among some NA
TO members and by su
spicion
by others. For ex
ample, on April 20
, 1964, Soviet and
American
pledges for cutbac
ks in fissionabl
e materials for use
in nuclear weapons was
simultaneously anno
unced. White Hous
e sources reported that
the decisions had
been made during
a recent
series of privat
e conversations be
tween President Ly
ndon B.
Johnson and Prem
ier Nikita Khrush
chev. Such actions
by the
40
Younger, "Relaxatio
n of East-West Te
Effect Upon the We
nsion and Its
st, p. 5.
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United States illuminated the
growing skepticism among the
members of the Western Allian
ce. For example, England gave
its consent to the agreement
a day following the announcement.
Fi- ance, however, was angere
d and frustrated by the "secret"
Russian/American negotiations 41
.
As the impression grew that bil
ateral Soviet-United States
negotiations were proceeding,
nationalistic tendencies seemed
to have been stimulated.
The issue was not whether the Uni
ted
States would conclude an agr
eement contrary to the wishes of
its allies. It was rather
that in an alliance of sovere
ign
states (NATO) each state will
conclude that it is a better
judge of its own requirements
and will not always be prepared
to allow another state to
negotiate for it in matters of
national concern (lack of trust)
. This atmosphere of "detente"
between the two superpowers
(United States and the Soviet
Union) removes, or in the
least reduces, the previous urg
ency
for cohesion within internati
onal military coalitions.42
Other factors, in addition to
the easing of tensions between the East and West, had
contributed to the lack of coh
esion that existed within the
North Atlantic Alliance by the
mid 196C's. Geographically
speaking, the difficulty in coordinating the interests of
the United States, with those
of
smaller European countries is
obvious. As an example, the
41
Facts on File: World News
Digest (New York:
File Inc., April 16-22, 196
4). p. 5.
42
Kissinger, The Troubled Par
tnership, p. 10.

Facts on
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interest and goals of the allies in their mutual security arrangements differ.
The United States, separated from Asia and Europe, still
relatively safe from conventional invasion, espoused strategic
doctrines and deployments whose main emphasis was on preventing general thermonuclear war.

Europeans were naturally more

sensitive than Americans to the dangers and destruction of a
so-called "limited conflict" that would be confined to European
soil.

They (Europeans), accordingly, proposed strategies,

force dispositions, troop deployments and types of weapon
systems whose emphasis was total deterrence of any military
action of even a limited nature.

The Western Europeans were

indeed uncomfortable with various aspects of the Robert McNamara
43
strategy of a "flexible response."
They were especially opposed to such doctrines as the "firebreak" or "nuclear pause."
The core of this policy was:

"given an attack by Soviet con-

ventional forces, U. S. defense would be limited to counter44
conventional forces."

This theory advanced the belief that

such confinement to strictly conventional weapons, in view of
a conventional attack, would create a military stalemate
(pause) during which time both sides would have political negotiating possibilities, avoiding the use of nuclear weapons.
The Europeans, who had lived through two great conventional
wars in less than fifty years, felt that the "pause" philosophy
43
For a programmed description of the flexible response
Strategy: se Appendix A, page 56 of this report.
44Di

ctionary of Political Science, ed. Joseph Dunner, (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1970), P. 380.
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of flexible response was too cost
ly for the benefits promised.
Andre Beaufre, a well-known French
strategic theorist,
explainc,d that Europe was instinctivel
y hostile to any doctrine
proposing any form of limited war.

He concluded that Europeans

generally preferred total peace by
great danger, rather than to
see Europe again become a theater
of even minor or limited
military operations.45
NATO's problems also had economic root
s.

Although the

loss of cohesion that had develope
d because of them was of
secondary rank compared with the disa
greement due to nuclear
issues, economic policy differences
were important determin46
ants of the future of the NATO alli
ance.
A marked revision
in the relative economic strength
s of the European members of
NATO had developed by the early 1960
's. Europe had experienced one of the most remarkable peri
ods of sustained economic
growth in the history of capitali
st countries.

The standard

of living of this area (Western Euro
pe) had increased to the
point where the Europeans coul
d carry a much larger share of
the economic burdens of the western
alliance and could insist
on a greater role in leading it.
The most important single outcome of
the economic resurgence of Europe has been the deve
lopment of the European Economic Community (EEC) or Common
Market. This strong economic
45Andr
e Beaufre, "Dissuasuion et Strategi
c." Survival
(March-April, 1965), p. 56.
46
Lawrence B. Krause, "Economic Problems
," in NATO In
Quest of Cohesion, ed. by Karl H.
Cerny and Henry W. Briefs
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1965), p. 65.

30
grouping enabled its members
to gain some measure of independence from the United States.
European independence had two
faces. On the one hand, indepe
ndence meant that Europe could
shoulder a larger share of
defense cost, would provide gre
ater
resources for the have-not cou
ntries, and would in general tak
e
on more of the responsibili
ties of the free world. On the
other hand, independence also
meant a rejection of United
States' leadership and all tha
t this implied.47
Net only did the creation of
a trade organization (EEC)
within Western Europe cause
a change in United States-Europea
n
relations, but it also caused
additional social and economic
clevages within Europe itself
. Not all of the Western European
Alliance members belonged to
the EEC. England was indiffere
nt
to the idea and hostile to
institutional arrangements which
impinged upon its national sov
ereignty. Her early decision
to remain outside of the Com
mon Market encouraged other countries to do likewise. These
countries joined England in organizing a rival trade gro
up, the European Free Trade Associ
ation. The purpose of this
association was threefold: (1)
to
provide an economic offset to
the member countries for the
loss they might suffer from
not being a member of the strong
er
Common Market; (2) to demons
trate the technical feasibility of
the free trade area technique
; (3) and to provide a bargaining
counterweight to the EEC.48
47
ibid. p. 304-05.
48

.
Void.
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From the standpoint of Atl
antic unity, the establish
ment
in Western Europe of two
separate and distinct free-t
rade areas
with tariff barriers bet
ween them was not a healthy
development.
Germany ae- d
were members of the more ila
pressi7:, Europeae
Economic Community while
England was one of several Eur
opean
countries that comprised
the European Free Trade Ass
ociation.
Both of these groups had
enjoyed a measure of econom
ic success.
However, this success was
deceptive, in that it made
the social,
political and ecenomic
cleavages of Europe more omi
nous. The
more each group succeeded
in directing the trade of
member
countries toward other mem
ber countria:; of the same gro
up, the
greater became the welfar
e loss of trade diversion.
Since NATO
member states were presen
t in both economic organizat
ions the
military, diplomatic, and
cohesive consequences to thi
s alliance had to be assume
d.
Great Britain, having fac
ed up to the fact that her ent
ry
into the Common Market
would be to her national bet
terment,
applied for membership int
o that group. It was cle
ar from the
start that negotiations
would be very difficult.
Some tentative
settlements had been rea
ched, but many difficult pro
blems remained to be solved when
the negotiations were abrupt
ly halted
in January of 1963 by
the unilateral actions of Pre
sident
Charles de Gaulle.
It is difficult to kno
w all the factors that wen
t into
de Gaulle's decision to
exclude Britain from membershi
p in the
Common Market, but certai
nly the issue of nuclear arm
aments
played a major part. Whe
n the United States cancelled
the

32
Skybolt missile project, a crisis develcped for British strategic planning since they counted upon this missile to contribute to their nuclear weapons delivery systems.

The

choice made by Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau was to accept continued dependence upon the United States by agreeing
to rely on Polaris-type missiles.

This was in direct con-

tradiction to the independent concept as espoused by the European Economic Community, and especially in relation to the
stand taken by French President de Gaulle.49
It is self-evident that politicc-military collaboration
cannot exist where there is economic friction.

The North At-

lantic Treaty Organization was severely divided on economi
c
issues during the 1960's.
From the preceding material one may conclude that, by the
early 1960's, the NATO Alliance was losing much of the cohesion that characterized its formation.

The reduction of East-

West tensions, geographic differences, economic problems and
differing views by individual members concerning defense strategies had placed new and severe strains on the alliance.

It

was in this divisive atmosphere that the multilateral nuclear
force was proposed.

This force, which had originally been

conceived as an instrument for establishing closer relations
among the NATO members and thwarting independent nuclear aspir1

ations, in fact amplified the lack of cohesion within this
organization and seemed to have accelerated the movement toward independent nuclear forces.
49Ibid., p. 309.

CHAPTER IV
NATO AND NUCLEAR SHARING:

THE MLF

The proposal for the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force and the debate which ensued within the councils
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization demonstrated a
variety of weaknesses in the relations between the members of
this alliance.

A lack of agreement (cohesion) among the member

states concerning the degree of emphasis that should be placed
on such a force as a policy of nuclear deterrence was amply
shown.

This proposal also exemplified the lack of cohesion

within NATO due to the presence of national pride and - 1.aims
of sovereignty.

Essentially, the proposal for and the debate

concerning the MLF was a prime example of the divisive nature
of intra-alliance politics, common in most international military coalitions.
Politics may be analyzed as human activities where more or
less unequal participants debate, discuss and openly compete,
under a system of coercion, to achieve advantages and/or avoid
disadvantages in the acquisition of goals or ends.

Bargaining

is a central component of such a process, however it is quite
common for power and prestige to be utilized in a coercive manner in order to achieve ends.

"The Process also operates in

50
Friedman, Alliance in International Politics, p. 7.
33
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the endless conflicts between nations and between international
51
blocs.
Therefore, such a description can to some degree be
applied to the field of international relations.

This can be

seen by the United States' efforts to create a workable multilateral nuclear force within the framework of NATO.
In this highly competitive atmosphere, such problems as
the political control of nuclear weapons become most acute.
Political control of nuclear weapons goes far beyond the basic
strategic and military considerations.

The multilateral nuclear

force, advanced as a means to solve this problem, foundered
on such basic issues as:

a lack of consensus concerning the

degree of emphasis to be placed on the MLF (by each potential
participant) as a policy of nuclear deterrence; a lack of
agreement on the delegation of authority (national sovereignty);
a lack of clear understanding of the structural organization
to be utilized; a lack of nuclear deterrent value due to the
various levels and types of veto powers; and a lack of trust
that once the casus foderis arose, the partners would meet
their stated commitments.
The MLF was presented to the members of NATO as a proposed
method of sharing nuclear responsibility within the Alliance.
Could there actually be a sharing of such an awesome (life
and death) issue?

A major factor relevant to this question

was that, by the early 1960 1 s, the Soviet Union had so advanced
in the development of nuclear weaponry that a degree of nuclear
51
Bertram M. Gross, "Political Process," International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences XII (New York: Macmillan
Co., and the Free ryess, 1968), p. 265.
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equality (parity) betwee
n the two super powers (the Uni
ted
States and Russia) was eviden
t. The importance of this new
Soviet nuclear capability was
reflected in the fact that
the
United States was forced to
revise its foreign policy.
No
longer (due to the possibili
ty of mutual destruction) was
the
past policy of massive retali
ation feasible.
Now the American constituency
and consequently American
foreign policy began to str
ess the high priority of possib
le
arms control, non-proliferati
on of nuclear weapons, forms
of
crisis management and genera
l East-West citente. Such for
eign
policy revisions were mad
e within the American consti
tuency
an expression of national
sovereignty), excluding the
influence of the Allies.
Sovereignty has always bee
n a stumbling-block to effect
ive
intra-alliance cohesion. Thi
s has been especially true in
relation to the sharing of
weapons and defense systems amo
ng
alliance members. This
problem is greatly complicat
ed when
considering weapons
mass destruction. Under such
circumstances each country, qui
te naturally, considers itself
to be
the best judge of it: own
destiny, and attempts, though
not
always successfully, to
make and/or influence decisi
ons in its
own best interest.
The United States has had
a long-standing aversion to the
sharing of nuclear respon
sibilities, as is expressed
by the
Atomic Energy Act of 194
6, which legally prohibited
the dissemination of atomic inf
ormation or of fissionable mat
erials
to any foreign governmen
t. This act was amended in 195
4,
allowing the United States
to cooperate more freely with
those
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foreign governments recognized as nuclear powers under the
act, for example Great Britain.
The achievement of nuclear parity between Moscow and
Washington intensified this ieluctance to share nuclear responsibility by the American public.

This, in turn, had a

negative effect upon the relationships within the Atlantic
Alliance.

Due to the very nature of nuclear power, responsib-

ility in this field cannot be shared among the members of an
alliance.

Thus, when an international alliance, for example

NATO, confronts such a problem, the loss of a certain amount
of cohesion is inevitable.
The MLF proposal proved difficult for the United States
to present for it was an extraordinarily complicated project
on which there was no clear consensus within NATO.

There ex-

isted a lack of clarity about the real objectives to be achieve
d
by the MLF.

It became the focus for a variety of diverse

hopes, and the supporters of the MLF proposal had many contradictory motives.

As Mr. Kissinger has pointed out:

It was supposed to revitalize NATO, yet reduce the
role of France in Europe. It was to prevent nuclear
proliferation and yet satisfy alleged German desires
for a share of nuclear control. It simultaneously
sought to meet requirements of the Pentagon for central control over nuclear weapons and the hopes of
many Europeans for the emergence of a European nuclear
force.52
Much of the divisiveness concerning this proposal stemmed
from the indecisive nature of American defense strategy of the
early 1960's.

Washington incessantly urged NATO member states

to increase and modernize their conventional force levels and,
52Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, p. 139.
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to allay European fears about the availability
of nuclear weapons in times of crisis, proposed the multilater
al nuclear
force.

NATO members, some of whom desired a greater voice
in

the formulation of defense strategies, were
dissatisfied with
both proposals.

The European nations, in short, were skept-

ical of the new policy of "flexible response,"
especially in
regard to such aspects as the so-called
nuclear pause and transparent strategy.

Many Europeans remained deeply committed to

the defense posture of massive retaliation,
as it has been
construed under the concept of an American nucle
53
ar umbrella.
A great deal of the confasion concerning the propo
sal for
the MLF may have been due to the shift
ing and changing emphasis
placed on the importance of this program by
the United St31:es.
In the early 1960's the United States conti
nued to stress conventional arms build-up by the North Atlantic Treat
y Organization member states.

Administration spokesmen invited American

allies to analyze the problem of nuclear contr
ol within the
Alliance and to develop a mutually satisfactory
control plan.
Dean Rusk stressed that it was up to the Europ
eans to formulate
a concrete proposal:

"We have not ourselves put forward a

precise plan," he announced, "... this is somet
hing that our
friends across the Atlantic would presumably
wish to do."54
Such prior conditiens put forth by Washi
ngton, concerning conventional build-up and European control
plans, suggested that
the United States originally did not consi
der the MLF scheme
53Wallace C. Magathan, Jr., "West German Defen
se Policy,"
Orbis VIII (Summer, 1964), p. 293.
54U.S. Department of State Pulletin XLVII, (Dece
mber 31,
1962) No. 1227, p. 995.
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totally nor eminently
urgent.

Given the fact that none of

the American allies
possessed sea-borne nuclear sys
tems at
the time the offer was
made and that a command and con
trol
system even for a single
national force was a complicat
ed
matter, the probability
that United States' allies wou
ld
develop a meaningful con
trol system was remote.55
There was an abrupt cha
nge in the American approa
ch which
appeared to have been lin
ked with two events: (1)
the press
conference of French Pre
sident Charles de Gaulle in
January,
1963; and (2) the signin
g of a Franco-German Treaty
of cooperation in February of thi
s same year. The multilate
ral nuclear
program was suddenly thrust
into the forefront of Americ
an
foreign policy, apparentl
y as a means to thwart Pre
sident de
Gaulle's European object
ives and to eliminate the
possibility
of their having an effect
on the Federal Republic of
Germany.
It was not until the
political meaning of Charle
s de Gaulle's
veto in January, 1963 of
British entry into the Common
Market
had been grasped in Was
hington that the Kennedy Adm
inistration,
although still somewhat
hesitantly, began to throw
its full
diplomatic weight behind
the MLF proposal. Such
a change of
emphasis, with its concur
rent increase of tempo,
appeared to
have been intended ess
entially to avert a possib
le Franco-German
military collaboration,
with the implicit danger
that it would
lead to some kind of
independent German nuclear
deterrent, or
to German participation
56
in a Franco-German nuclea
r agreement.
55Kissinger, The Troubl
ed Partnership, pp. 129-30
.
56Cleveland, The Atlantic
Idea and its European Rivals
,
p. 56.
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This sudden switch of policy was thrust upon a bewildered,
divided alliance.
Military specialists usually agree that it is impossible
to suddenly change from one strategy to another without suffering some type of adverse consequences.

This is especially

true when one has to deal with an arsenal containing weapons
as divergent as conventional and nuclear armaments.

Henry

Kissinger, for example, predicted that once committed to a
conventional defense system, the country that decided to switch
57
to nuclear weapons would be lost.

Reflecting the general

European view against conventional war, Franz-Josef Strauss,
former West German Minister of Defense, warned:
A conventional war would produce such unimaginable
destruction to Europe that one can not consider it
the lesser evil ... In our exposed geographical
position one can not warn loudly enough against the
concept that we could eliminate the nuclear weapon
and thereby open the valve of conventional war.D8
One must conclude that the Federal Republic's apparent
support of the MLF was not based on a belief that such a plan
held any promise of real participation in control of nuclear
warheads, but rather on the assumption that it would be a new
and stronger- link in the American nuclear guarantee to Europe.
West Germany primarily desired to retain a strong relationship
with the United States by demonstrating its "reliability" as an
57Pierre M. Gallois, "U.S. Strategy and the Defense of
Europe," Orbis VII (Summer, 1963), p. 245. See also Henry
Kissinger, "Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear," Fifteen
Nations, (March, 1961).
58
Franz-Josef Strauss, "Speech before International Students
in Bonn, (July 28, 1962), quote from Wallace C. Magathan, Jr.
"West German Defense Policy," Orbis VIII (Summer, 1964), p. 296.
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ally and hoped that
such participation wou
ld enhance its ability to influence Ame
rican foreign policy 59
.
The smaller countries
within NATO, generally
wanted no
direct association wit
h nuclear weapons; the
y felt most secure
under the "nuclear umb
rella" of the United
States. Also such
countries, already inv
olved in a conventional
force build-up,
found it financially
impractical to incur the
added expense of
a nuclear defense, but
felt compelled to joi
n various MLF study
groups because of the
wish not to alienate
the senior ally.60
Countries which were
potentially major con
tributors to a
multilateral nuclear
force were deeply inv
olved in their own
nuclear projects or,
lacking any detailed blu
eprint from the
United States, believ
ed the problem to be ins
oluble. France,
for example, refuse
d to entertain the ide
a of a NATO nuclear
force. This refusal
was admittably based upo
n political as
well as technical rea
sons. Politically spe
aking, participation in such an int
egrated force was con
trary to French policy
as that country was
determined to develop
its own independent
nuclear force. Techni
cally, France was far
less advanced than
England in the nuclea
r field and it would
prove difficult if
not impossible for Fra
nce to participate
in an Atlantic nuclear
59
Donald Brandon, Americ
an Foreion Policy: Bey
ism and Realism (New
ond UtopianYork: Appleton-Centu
ry-Crofts, 1966), po.
185. See also Fritz
Erler, "Paper dated Oct
ober 13, 1964, prepared for meeting of
the Atlantik-Brucke and
the American Council on Germany," (Berli
n: November 12-15,
196
4), mimeographed,
p. 7.
60
Magathan, "West German
Defense Policy," p. 299
.
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club and still be able to advance her technology as rapidly as
61
was desired.
England had seemed to give her approval originally to
the establishment of a MLF when it was proposed at Nassau in
December, 1962.

However, London apparently envisioned a force

based on a multinational concept organized around a closer commitment of existing national forces rather than an entirely new
force (United States multilateral nuclear force).62

England

progressed from a somewhat confused acceptance of the MLF at
its outset to a complete rejection of it by early 1965.

All

along the British felt despite their close ties with the United
States, the last line of their defense lay in their own resources.

"There may be conditions," Harold Macmillan, as Prime

Minister, told the House of Commors shortly after the Cuban
crisis, "There must be areas in which the interest of some
countries may seem to them more vital than they seem to
others . . . I would hope that Britain will be able, for as
long as possible, to maintain her position free from threat,
and should be able, should the necessity arise, to make her
independent decisions on issues vital to her life."63

In the

desire to have their own independent deterrents, both England
and France agreed with the United States that the question of
national survival (questions of life and death of a country)
6
1Herve Alphand, "Address to the World Affairs Council,"
Ambassade de France (Monday, March 11, 1963), p. 5.
62
For a more precise desciiption of this agreement see
the Joint Communique and Attached Statement on Nuclear Defense
Systems presented in Appendix A, page 58 of this report.
63
Harold Macmillan, "Debate in the House of Commons,"
Weekly Hansard, No. 517, (March 11-14, 1963), col. 932.
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was too serious to be delega
ted to any ally.

Each refused to

give up control of its nation
al arsenal to any other nation
or grouping of nations.
Given this sovereign nature of
the members of NATO, effective decision making and contro
l would have required an extraordinary degree of harmony and
trust, and this goes to the
root of NATO's basic proble
m, a lack of cohesion. It seemed
true that in economic affair
s NATO officials had engaged in
important forms of cooperati
on, cutting across exclusive authority of national governmen
ts. Sovereign states of NATO had
gone far indeed in relinquis
hing some independence in return
for economic, political, and
military policies in special
fields of common interest:
but they were far from surrendering
control of vital defense
and foreign policies to any contral
authority, such as the MLF.
In these crucial fields the nationstate was still the ultima
te political unit, for which there
was no substitute. This
was the NATO-MLF dilemma, for the
problem of sovereignty bec
ame most acute over the issue of
nuclear control.64
The United States, the spo
nsoring nation of the multilateral nuclear force propos
al, was the obvious leader in the nuclear field within NATO.
As the leader, America's function was
to set an example for its
followers. In order to get Europeans
to surrender a lot of the
ir sovereignty (and this would hav
e
been necessary ui the MLF
was to come into existence) the
64,
-C. S. Congress, House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on the North Atlantic
Treaty Oroanization, 98th Congre
ss,
2nd Session, 1966, p. 90.
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United States would have had to surrender a littl
e of its own.
Of course de facto (in point of fact; actua
l or actually) some
sovereignty would have been given up in the form
of mixedmanning.

However, in this case some de lure (from the law;
by

right) surrender was required, if this proje
ct were to succeed.
Only by surrendering its veto power over the
multilateral
nuclear force might the United States have been
able to undermine the French force de frappe, thus stimulatin
g the creation
of a European political authority, which would
have included
Britain.

American reluctance stemmed primarily from the fact

that decisions concerning nuclear weapo
ns and nuclear control
were, by their very nature, concerned with
the question of life
and death of the United States itself.

Such reluctance by the

American authorities in the pcssible sharing
of nuclea:. weapons
found its legal expression in the MacMahon
Act (passed in 1946
and amended in 1954) which reserved nucle
ar questions primarily
for Americans, and therefore placed such
questions outside of
the Atlantic Alliance.

The sharing of nuclear responsibilities,

which might have been desired by a numbe
r of NATO allies,
foundered or the MacMahon Act.

Legally then, the decision to

use nuclea - weapons could not be shared.

This decision rep-

resented an expression of rational sovereignt
y at a time when
the survival of the country seemed at
stake.

Furthermore, the

ownership of nuclear weapons could not be
shared.

Countries

65
Frederick W. Mulley, "Nuclear Weapons: Chall
enge to
National Sovereignty," Oibis VIII (Spring,
1963), p. 103.
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could not consent to finance armaments, the use of which would
not be under their control.

The sponsors of the multilateral

nuclear force found it impossible to resolve such conflicts
of national interest.
This may be one of the reasons why European commentators
frequently pointed out that the American proposal for a multilateral nuclear force within NATO, however useful it might have
been symbolically, to increase European sense of participation in nuclear defense, was not a plan for nuclear sharing
67
but rather a means of consolidating American control.

It

was possible that European governments may have been in a
better position to influence and understand American nuclear
3
.

strategy due to their participation in the MLF, but the power
to decide when and where to use nuclear weapons would remain
in the hands of the President of the United States.68
If Washington held the ultimate veto through any form
of negative control, such as custody of warheads or delivery
vehicles, this would have largely counteracted the political
rational of an "integrated" multilateral nuclear force.

But

if the United States retained no specific control, two types
of risks would accrue.

There was the possibility of a paraly-

sis in multilateral European decision making which would vitiate the credibility of such a force in a time of crisis.

r 14

66General Andre Beaufre, NATO and Europe (New York:
Vintage Books, 1966), pp. 86-87.
67
Beaufre, "Dissuasion et Strategie," p. 56.
68
The New York Times, December 10, 1962, p. 8.
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the other hand,
there was the risk th
at the force would be
used in circumstan
ces contrary to Americ
an interests. America
felt that the risks
mentioned were too hi
gh and refused ultimately to give up
the veto. If the MLF
had been established,
the veto power then
would have remained in
American hands.
This is essentially
true because of the
size of the MLF as
compared with the to
tal American nuclear
forces. The United
States alone would ha
ve been capable of ma
king an independent
nuclear decision.69
Washington retained
the power necessary
to block the use of
the MLF while the Eu
ropeans could neither
block the use of the
Strategic Air Comman
d (SAC) if and when
the United States de
sired to use it, no
r could the Europeans
force the use of the
American nuclear ar
senal if Washington
did not want it to be
engaged. Opponents
of the multilateral
concept regarded such
a force as a mere su
per-addition to
the United States st
rategic forces, exce
pt that this MLF
would be paid for in
part by European st
ates with funds that
could be better expend
ed in other more esse
ntial military
70
areas.
The multilateral nu
clear force therefore
would not
have involved sharin
g in a genuine sens
e because it would
not have altered ma
terially the locus of
nuclear power. It
proposed nuclear sharin
g in a symbolic an
d psychological
69
Robert E. Osgood, Th
e Case For the MLF:
Evaluation (Washingte
A Critical
n: Center of Foreig
n Policy Research,
1964), pp. 19-20.
70
Amme, Jr., NATO Withou
t France, p. 164.
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sense, this was not true sha
ring of nuclear control.
Perhaps this issue of nuclea
r control of a collective
force proved to be the mos
t intractable obstacle to its
establishment. The centra
l problem was to combine deterr
ent
effectiveness with political
feasibility, reconciling the
views of those wishing
to veto such use. This is the pro
blem
of "fifteen fingers" on
the safety catch and on the tri
gger.
American proponents of
the MLF skirted this delicate que
stion
of ultimate control and
instead stressed the technical
excellence of the hardware to
be purchased at considerable cos
t
to Europeans.71 The United
States apparently held the view
that since the multilateral
force did not as vet exist,
the
issue of nuclear control
need not be faced until a lat
er date.
The very size of the pro
posed multilateral nuclear for
ce
was hardly larger than
that of the independent nation
al forces
which the American Admini
stration had criticized as bei
ng
incapable of effective
deterrent value. To use thi
s fractional force (the MLF,
representing only approximatel
y two
per cent of the total Ame
rican force) would be to go
to war
with only the smallest
part of an available force. On
the
other hand, if the United
States agreed to go to war wit
h
her entire nuclear arsena
l, what would be the point in
creating a NATO nuclear force?
But, one must ask himself; 'do
es
the smallness of such a
nuclear force (small in relati
on to
the total American nuc
lear arsenal) void completely
the deterrence value of it?' Accord
ing to a view held by many wol
l
7 -Robert Strausz-Hupe,
'The Crisis of Political Leader
ship," in NATO In Quest
of Cohesion, ed. by Karl H. Cer
ny
and Henry Briefs (New Yor
k: Frederick A. Prager, 1965),
p.145.
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known military str
ategists (especially Europe
an) the size of
a force does not necess
arily void the deterrent
value of the
force. According to
Francois de Rose:
But the fact that a
force is small does not mea
n
that it necessarily_
is ineffective. . . Its
pu
rpose La small force/
should be to serve notice
that no war can be sta
rted in Europe without ru
nning the risk of bringi
ng into play either the
forces of America or the
European forces which,
though limited, would
none the less be capable of
inflicting unacceptable
destruction.72
Mr. de Rose concluded
further that if European
nuclear
forces (whether nation
al or multilateral) can
be deployed independently, "and if
they are so effective
as to be capable
of inflicting damage
that would seriously han
dicap the Soviet
Union in its overall
competition with the Uni
ted States, the
additional risk they
represent does cover ou
r (Europe) pro73
blem."
He contends that by pur
ely military standardL
the
independent non-American
forces thus deployed in
Europe might
appear puny and weak,
but if they potentially
delay or frustrate the success of
Russian goals, they are
not negligible.
They indeed, add to
the deterrent posture
of Europe and the
entire North Atlantic
Alliance.
An additional discordan
t feature of the MLF pro
posal was
the confusion surrou
nding the structural org
anization to be
utilized if and when
the program was to be
activated. This
plan was an extremely
ambiguous one. The rel
ationship between
72
Francois de nose, "At
lantic Relationships
Problems," Foreign Affair
and Nuclear
s, No. 3 (April,
1963), pp. 466-87.
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ends and means was not at
all clear.

For instance, in the

early speeches by United
States officials concerning the
MLF,
terms such as "multilatera
l," "integrated," or "unified"
were
.ot clarified, and nothin
g was said about how such a for
ce
was to be controlled, dep
74
loyed, or targeted.
Structural
confusion permeated the mul
tilateral plan from its concep
tion
to its death in 1965. As
early as 1962, with the Nas
sau Agreement, the United States
and Great Britain drew sharply
divergent conclusions from the
same document. The 3ritish imp
ression was that the Americ
ans were in agreement with them
that
the future structure of
a NATO force would be organized
around
closer commitment of exi
sting national forces rather
than a
new force. But, Americ
an officials had a different vie
w of
a NATO nuclear force.
It was to be an entirely new pro
posal
in which non-nuclear all
ies would win their right to par
ticipate by their financial
contributions. Britain's agr
eement
on the MLF was not set
tled at Nassau and London became
incleasingly hostile as
a multilateral instead of a
multinational concept was adv
anced.75 In fact, in late 196
4, the
Wilson Government tried
to undermine the MLF program,
which
they felt they could not
accept. They proposed an
Atlantic
Nuclear Force (ANF) as
an alternative. The ANF wou
ld allow
for limited German partic
ipation on a non-national
basis,
74u. S. Department of Sta
te Bulletin XLVII, (Septembe
r 27,
1962) No. 1217, pp. 604
-605. "Building the Atlant
ic Partnership: Some Lessons Fro
m the Past," speech by McGorg
e Bundy.
75
Buchan, "Tho Multilateral
Force: An Historical Perspective," p. 12.
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however, the larger part of the force woul
d be made up of
national contingents from England, Amer
ica, and France.

This

proposal was defended by the British Minister
of Defense who
explained "the only realistic basis for NATO
defense is to
accept that we cannot invest a greater port
ion of our GNP
than we are doing now.

Therefore, we can secure better value

76
for our money . . . with the forces we
now have.
Structural confusion of the MLF proposal was also
generated by Washington's shifting approach
to the type of vessels to be utilized.

At first the Allies were promised B-47

American bombers, together with British Vulc
an (subsDnic aircraft).

Later the United States government charmed to
Polaris

missile submarines manned by internat
ional crews.

Finally,

upon further reflection it suggested that
armed surfac7. ships,
which were less expensive to build and
technically better
adapted to European capabilities, would be
preferable.77
Such ambiguities created a fog of Euro
pean suspicion in reference to American actions and, as Francois
de Rose pointed
out, "misunderstandings had reached the poin
t where motives
were being questioned."78
Finally, the multilateral nuclear force falt
ered due to
a lack of trust among the potential particip
ants.

This force,

76Sir
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rs, No. 22 (August, 1965), p. 3.
771J.
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erence: John F. Kennedy," (March 6, 1963),
p. 241.
78
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as had been concluded, would be primarily under the control
of the United States.

European countries, and especially

France, argued that aJthough they found no fault with American intentions to defend Europe, they were not convinced that
in all possible crisis situations Americans woull live up to
their stated commitments.

Europe was not sure that a United

States President would risk his own population to nuclear
attack for essentially European interests.79

As French Ambas-

sador Herve Alphand explained, the French and British decision
to acquire nuclear weapons did not imply a lack of confidence
in the United States per se.

It is a fact of international

life that no state will invite its own destruction in order
to defend others.

Therefore, the silaller countries feel that

it will be best to have an independent means of deterri.nq
moves against their vital interests.

The growth of independ-

ent nuclear forces could not be checked by the establishment
of a mixed-manned force such as the MLF.80

79
Mulley, "Nuclear Weapons:
Sovereignty," p. 38.
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Alphand, "Address to the World Affairs Council," p. 3.

CHAPTER V
SUY2,1ARY AND CONCLUSION
A military coalition may
increase its military power
quantitatively, by expanding
the numerical strength of its
existing military force lev
el, or qualitatively, by rep
lacing or modifying its exi
sting forms of military force
(normally weapons systems) wit
h new and more effective for
ms of
force. Expansion and inn
ovation are thus possible
characteristics of any military
coalition.
The MLF was originally
presented to the members of NAT
O
as a qualitative measur
e which would increase cohesion
and
harmony in the Alliance
through individual participatio
n in
a mix-manned nuclear for
ce. It (MLF) germinated out
of a
series of inquiries con
cerned with the changing relati
onships of the NATO Allian
ce vis-a-vis both the United
States
and the Soviet Union. In
the light of such changing
relationships new questions
were put forth. Why should
the
United States continue to
exercise a nuclear monopoly?
From this main question
arose still others, such as
the weakness in American leader
ship, the credibility of Uni
ted States'
protection of Europe in
the event of crisis, and the
charges
of a new colonialism in
the making, in which Europe wou
ld
51
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become a permanent ward of America.81
Due to such questions, the United States felt it necessary in 1960 to demonstrate to its NATO allies that it was
willing to share in the control of the nuclear deterrent.
This decision was presented in a NATO communique of December,
1960, in which Washington proposed a multilateral nuclear
force as a qualitative addition to the Atlantic Alliance's
military power structure.82

This suggestion raised as many

questions as it proposed to solve.

This new mixed-manned

nuclear force would have to conform with a Congressional requirement (the MacMahon Act) that the final decision for the
use of American made nuclear weapons would have to rest with
the President of the United States; it had to anticipate the
negative effect such a plan would have upon any present or
future disarmament and nonproliferation talks; in short, it
would have to create the illusion of equality and sharing
while actually maintaining the primacy of American control.
The MLF proposal failed in the midst of European suspicions
and concentrated French opposition.
A lesson that may be drawn from the futile effort to
establish a multilateral nuclear force is that there was no
apparent solution to the problem of nuclear control that was
satisfactory to all the major members of NATO.

The United

States was unable to give its allies a genuine share in the
81
Lawrence W. Kaplan, Recent American Foreign Policy:
Conflicting Interpretations (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey
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control of nuclear weapons, although that seemed to be the
only proposal which would have fully met European desires
to share in the decisions concerning nuclear deterrence.
America was unable to do this because the political prerequisites were lacking; joint management of major nuclear
forces within the Alliance assumed an Atlantic political
community that did not exist.83

The Atlantic Alliance re-

mained a grouping of independent sovereign nation-states.
The failure of the multilateral nuclear force was a prime
example of an inherent weakness of such an alliance.

Appar-

ently there are limitations upon the cohesiveness that can
be expected from an international organization.

The sharing

of nuclear responsibility as proposed by the MLF, would have
infringed upon the sovereignty of the member nations, ..- nd
this was unacceptable to most members of NATO.

The diffi-

culty with the plan to create an MLF then was that it presupposed a common political authority over the Alliance
which had not been achieved.
It seems no longer possible to speak of integrated or
supra-national policies to Europe while practicing national
decision making in the United States.

Washington found it

increasingly difficult to urge European cooperation, while
insisting on complete freedom of action itself.

The change

in European attitudes toward the United States has been

in-

troduced by the resurgenc,,i! of Europe economically and
83Cleveland, The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals,
p. 63.
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politically and by the demise of an immediate czmmunist
84
threat.
A stronger Europe, free from fear of econorc collapse
and Soviet invasion, has turned its resentment toward American nuclear monopoly and over-dependence on the United
States.

Many European countries, especially France, have

been very outspoken in describing their desires for a United
Europe as a formidable power, capable of defending itself
from an aggressor, beholden to no other nation.

This spirit

of European nationalism came in the wake of prosperity and
self-confidence.

Whether a United Europe could come into

being is debatable because each country remains reluctant
to submerge the national sovereignty which has :7z,ant so much
to them.
America has been alarmed by the new European nationalist tendencies.

Washington seems to have forgotten that the

initial purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Orcanization
was to aid the war-torn Europeans to reach a point where
they would be capable of defending themselves from aggres-

sion.

Europe's emerging ability to do so seems a mark of

NATO's success, not a stigma of its failure.

ThrE reconstruc-

tion of Europe has in fact proceeded at such a fantastic rate
that the Allies are presently becoming formidab17, rivals economically, and full-fledged partners militarily.
84Robert Kleiman, Atlantic Crisis:
Confronts a Resurgent Europe (New York:
1.9(7)4), p. 154.
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In conclusion, the MLF proposal, presented as an instrument of cohesion, in reality, amplified the lack of cohesion
that has been growing within NATO throughout the past decade.
This lack of cohesion may not be viewed as a sign of total
failure, but rather one of success.

The most successful

form of military alliance is one which prevents open hostilities.

The lack of alliance cohesion within NATO stems frcm

a decrease in international tensions and fears which NATO
helped to allay.

Perhaps one must assume that the time has

come for America to re-evaluate its role in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and to consider whether this alliance
has not fulfilled the purpose that gave rise to its conception.

APPENDIX A
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DEFENCE EXPENDITURES OF
NATO COUNTRas irSIPRE.Sz:
GROSS NATIONAL ITIODUCi(GNP at factor cott

current

Ib.

Country

(0)
Belgium
Canada
Denmaik
France
Fed. Rep. of Geimany
Greece
Italy
Luxemlxiorg
Netherlands
Norway
Portt:gal
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States

19.4)

(1)
2.5
2.6
2.1
6.4

1950

(2)

1931

1952

1953

1954

1 ').f,5

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

5.2
9.0
3.7
11.0
4.9
5.6
4.3
3.2
6.2
5.6
4.6
5.4
11.2
14.7

5.0
8.1
3.6
8.7
4.7
6.0
4.6
3.6
6.6
5.6
4.7
6.0
9.9
12.7

4.1
7.6
3.6
7.6
4.8
5.7
4.2
3.6
6.2
4.4
4.7
5.6
9.2
11.0

7.2

6.6

6.7

5.8

12.4
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mceungs that I hie had the prisi:ege of having
b,,th w:th ‘ou, sir, and iour predececsory, marl a
ino‘t imp...mai-it. indeed vital part in the close association between our .:,tintries, who base been through
so much together in the past, and who have such
high hopes together for the future.
Since I became Prime Minister of the United Kingdom I ha..c had the good foitunc to /lase many
meetings. both with you, sir, and sour predecessor.
Indeed, this is the t 6th such meeting that I have had.
and as I 1.”. I believe they are of the greatest value.

But they are all the more agreeable when we are
allowed to base the,. n surroundings such as we
see here today, and we are ser grateful to the
Gosernor. to the administration, and to 21 the people
ot the island for their kindness, for their reception
of us. tor the good will that I am sure you feel,
Mr. President, they have toward you and the cJunuy of which ou are proud to be the head. I trust
that the work that we shall do will be, moire so
because it
be held M such delightful surroundings, effectlie and fruitful. I wekome you, sir.

554 Joint Statement Following Discussions With Prime Minister
Macmillan--The Nassau Agreement. December 21, 1962
THE PRESIDENT and the Prime Minister
met in Nassau from December ISth to December 21St. They were accompanied by
the Secretary of Defense. Mr. McNamara,
and the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Ball.
and by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Home.
the Minister of Defense. Mr. Thorneycroft
and the Secretary of State for Commonvvealth Relations and Colonies, Mr. Sandys.
The President and the Prime Minister
discussed a wide range of topics. "Fhey reviewed the state of East-Wcst relations in the
aftermath of the October crisis in Cuba, and
joined in the hope that a satisfactory resolution of this crisis might open the way to the
settlement of other problems outstanding
between the West and the Soviet Union.
In particular, they reviewed the present
state of the negotiations for a treaty ending
nuclear tests, and reaffirmed their intent to
seek agreement on this issue with the
U.S.S.R.. in the hope that this agreement
would lead on to successful negotiations on
wider issues of disarmament.
As regards Berlin, they reaffirmed their
interest in arriving at a solid and enduring
settlement which would insure that Berlin
remains free and viable.
The Chinese Communist attack on India
was discussed with special consideration
being gisen to the way in which the two
governments might assist the Gosernment
of India to counter this aggressirn. Defense
problems of the subcontinent were reviewed.
The Prime Minister and the President are

hopeful that the common interests of Pakistan and India in the security of the subcontinent would lead to a reconciliation of
Indian-Pakistan differences. To this end,
they expressed their gratification at the statesmanship shown by President Ayub and
Prime Minister Nehru in agreeing to renew
their efforts to resolve their differences at
this crucial moment.
The two leaders discussed the current
state of affairs in the Congo, and agreed to
continue their efforts for an equitable integration of this troubled country. They expressed support for Mr. Spaak's proposal for
a fair disision of revenues and noted with
concern the dangers of further discord in
the Congo.
The Prime .Minister informed the President of the present state of negotiations for
U.K. membership in the Common Market.
The President reaffirmed the interest of the
United States in an early and successful
outcome.
The President and the Prime Minister also
discussed in considerable detail policy on
advanced nuclear weapons systems and considered a variety of approaches. The result
of this discussion is set out in the attached
statement.
STATEMENT ON NUCLEAR DEFENSE SYSTEMS

t. The President and the Prime Minister
reviewed the development program for the
Skvbolt missile. The President explained
that it was no longer expected that this very
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John F. Kennedy, 1962
comp!cx weapon system would be cornpleted ss ithin the cost estimate or the time
scale %%bids %%tie projected when the program was begun.
a. The President informed the Prime
Minister that for this reason and because of
the asailability to the United Sutes of alternatise weapons systems. he had decided to
cancel plans for the production of Skybolt
for use by the United States. Nevertheless,
recognizing the importance of the Skybolt
program for the United Kingdom, and recalling that the purpose of the offer of Skybolt to the United Kingdom in 1960 had
been to assist in improsing and extending
the elective life of the British V-bombers,
the President expressed his readiness to continue the desclopment of the missile as 1
joint enterprise between the United States
and the United Kingdom, with each countty bearing equal shares of the future cost
of completing deselopment, after which the
United Kingdom would be able to place a
production order to meet its requirements.
3. While recognizing the value of this
offer. the Prime Minister decided, after full
consideration, not to avail himself of it because of doubts that had been expressed
about the pro4pects of success for this weapons sy stem and because of uncertainty regarding date of completion and finai cost of the
program.
4. As a possible alternative the President
suggested that the Royal Air Force might
use the Hound Dog missile. The Prime
Minister responded that in the light of the
technical difficulties he was unable to accept
this sungestion.
5. The Prime Minister then turned to the
possibility of prosision of the Polaris missile
to the United Kingdom by the United
States. After careful review. the President
and the Prime :Minister agreed that a decision on Polaris must be considered in the
widest context both of the future defense of
the Atlantic Alliance and of the safety of
the whoie Free World. They reached the
conclusion that this issue created an opportunity for the development of new and closer
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arrangements for the organization and control of strategic Western defense and that
such arrangements in turn could make a
major contribcnion to political cohe;ion
among the nations of the Alliance.
6. The Prime Minister suggested and the
President agreed. that for the immediate
future 1 start could be made by subscribing
to NATO some part of the forces already in
existence. This could include allocations
from United States Strategic Forces, from
United Kingdom Bomber Command, and
from tactical nuclear forces now held in
Europe. Such forces would be assigned as
pan of a NATO nuclear force and targeted
in accordance with NATO ptins.
7. Returning to Polaris the President and
the Prime Minister agreed that the purpose
of their two governments with respect to the
provision of the Polaris missiles must be the
development of
multilateral NATO nuclear force in the closest consultation with
other NATO allies. They will use their
best endeavors to this end.
8. Accordingly, the President and the
Prime Minister agreed that the U.S. will
make available on a continuing basis Polaris
missiles (less warheads) for British submarines. The U.S. will also study the feasibility of making available certain support
facilities for such submarines. The U.K.
Gosernment will construct the submarines in
which these weapons will be placed and they
wili also provide the nuclear warheads for
the Polaris missiles. British forces developed
under this plan will be assigned and targeted
in the same way as the forces described its
paragraph 6.
These forces, and at least equal U.S. forces,
would be made available for inclusion in a
NATO multilateral nuclear force. The
Prime Minister made it clear that except
where H.M.G. may decide that supreme
national interests are at stake, these British
forces will be used fur the purposes of international defense of the Western Alliance in
all circumstances.
9. The President and the Prime Minister
are convinced that this new plan will
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strengthen the nuclear defence of the Western Alliance. In strategic terms this defense
is indivisible, and it is their conviction that
in all ordinary circumstances of crisis or
danger, it is this very unity which is the best
protection of the West.
JO. The President and the Prime Minister

agreed that in addition to having a nuclear
shield it is important to have a non-nuclear
sword. For this purpose they agreed on the
importance of increasing the effectiveness of
their conventional forces on a worldwide
basis.

555 Proclamation 3511: Emancipation Proclamation Centennial.
December 28, 1962
By the President of the United States of
America a Proclamation:
WHEREAS January I, 1961, marks the centennial of the Proclamation in which President Abraham Lincoln declared all persons
held as slaves in States or parts of States still
in rebellion to be "then, thenceforward, and
forever free"; and
WHEREAS the issuance of the Emancipation
Proclamation marked the beginning of the
end of the iniquitous institution of slavery in
the United States, and a great stride toward
the fulfillment of the principle of the Declaration of Independence that "al! men are
created equal,that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights. that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness"; and
WHEarAs the Emancipation Proclamation
and the 13th, Nth and t5th amendments to
the Constitution of the United States guaranteed to Negro citizens equal rights with all
other citizens of the United States and have
made possible _..-reat progress toward the
enjoyment of those rights; and
WHEREAS the goal of equal rights for all
our citizens is still unreached. and the securing of these rights is one of the great unfinished tasks of our democracy:
Now, TH ER E Et. R E, 1, JoHN F. KENNEDY,
President of the United States of America,
do hereby proclaim that the Emancipation
Proclamation expresses our Nation's policy,
founded on justice and morality, and that it
is therefore fitting and proper to commemorate the centennial of the historic Emancipation Proclamation throughout the ear 1963.
910
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I call upon the Governors of the States,
mayors of cities, and other public officials, as
Wen 25 private persons, organizations, and
groups, to observe the centennial by appro.
priate ceremonies.
I seat:est the United States Commission
on Civil Rights to plan and participate in
appropriate commemorative activities recognizing the centennial of the issuance of the
Emancipation Proclamatinn; and I also request the Commission on Civil Rights and
other Federal agencies to cooperate fully with
State and local governments during 1963.:
commemorating these events.
I call upon all citizens of the United States
and all officials of the United States and of
every State and local government to dedicate
themselves to the completion of the task of
assuring that every American, regardless of
his rare, religion, color, or national origin,
eniovs all the rights guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
IN Worm.ss \\THEREOF,I have hereunto set
my hand and caused the Seal of
[SEAL] the United States of America to be
affixed this aSth day of December
in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred
and sixty-two and of the Independence of
the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-sixth.
joliN F. KENNEDY
By the President:
DE 4,N RUSK
Secretary of State
NO 1i 'Ile pro. tamatien
Beach, Fla.

was

released at Palm
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